Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100080001

CIA/SAVA / WVIND 710703



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 3 July 1971

NSA Declassification/Release instructions on File.

For the President Only

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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1971
Weekly average for each month

600

500

400

300


-1968

200


1970

1970


APRIL 1971 - JULY 1971




USBATTLE DEATHS increased slightly to 23 from last week's 21.




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decreased to 202 from last week's 286. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.







INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE


Stand at four small, special purpose groups. The acceptance of three "gap-fill" groups, however, raises the weekly total to 1,723. The estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam/Cambodia since


1 October 1970 now stands at some 74,300-76,300.







increased to 627 from last week's 602.





ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION rose sharply to 2,280 from last week's low of 1,419.





south vietnamese effectiveness as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces increased to 87% from the low 80% of last week.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

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In South Vietnam, enemy-initiated activity was at generally low levels country-wide during the past week and consisted primarily of scattered attacks by fire and light ground action. While renewed heavy fighting seems likely in northern Quang Tri Province, no significant increase is expected in other parts of the country.

In north Laos, Vang Pao's rainy-season offensive has clearly caught the North Vietnamese off balance. His irregulars, virtually uncontested, are ranging far and wide over the Plain of Jars destroying significant amounts of the enemy's supplies and retaking key high ground positions. Additionally, the siege of Bouam Long has been lifted as the enemy has been forced to deploy his forces southward to counter the threat posed by Vang Pao's irregulars. The rest of the country has remained relatively quiet. Government forces were able to reoccupy Muong Phalane in the central Panhandle very briefly before stiff resistance forced their withdrawal.

The three-pronged Cambodian government operation to establish strongholds along the Tonle Toch northeast of Phnom Penh is being delayed by heavy rains and enemy harassment but is making slow progress. On 4 July, the first rice convoy of 62 trucks from Battambang reached Phnom Penh without incident. Additional convoys will follow as part of the government's effort to relieve the current rice shortage in the capital.

Enemy Infiltration

The detection during the past week of four small, special purpose groups and the acceptance of three "gap-fill" groups raise the estimate of personnel moving toward South Vietnam/Cambodia since 1 October 1970 to some 74,300 - 76,300. This estimate would be increased if the groups, suggested by other recent gaps in the sequential numbering pattern, are confirmed as being in the system. Although earlier evidence suggested that the Communists intended to continue extensive activity in Laos through the current rainy season, the extremely heavy rainfall to date and the seriously deteriorating situation in the Lao Panhandle appear to have been more than the enemy had anticipated. Indeed, the Communists appear to be tying up loose ends within the system, an activity characteristic of the concluding phase of the personnel infiltration effort in the past. Thus, heavy inputs into the personnel infiltration pipeline may well have ended, but at least a sporadic flow of troops during the remainder of the rainy season seems likely.

South Vietnam Developments

Vice President Ky has announced that his running mate in the presidential elections will be Truong Vinh Le, a wealthy and prominent southern Catholic politician who served as President of the National Assembly during the later years of the Diem regime. Le's selection will probably gain Ky some support from Catholics, southerners, and other splinter groups who might otherwise vote for Thieu. However, it remains possible that Ky may have jumped the gun since Le, at latest report, had only tentatively accepted Ky's invitation to join the race. Meanwhile, a Ky aide asserts that Ky has received the tentative endorsements of more than the necessary 100 local councillors, but many of these signatures may not hold up in the face of strong pressure from the Thieu camp. Aides to both Ky and Big Minh have expressed the belief that Minh, who is said to be discouraged and pessimistic over his chances, will withdraw from the race if Ky fails to qualify.

The South Korean government has apparently decided to withdraw some 10-12,000 of its 48,000 troops in South Vietnam beginning in late 1971. The South Vietnamese had asked Seoul to delay its original plan to withdraw 17,000 men this year, and the new figure probably is a compromise worked out between Prime Minister Khiem and President Pak on 2 July.

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the two ROK divisions in MR 2 and the Marine brigade in MR 1 play important roles in the control war in regions where the enemy threat is substantial.

Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80T01719R000100080001-5 Communist Developments

Hanoi's public comments on Madame Binh's seven-point proposal have neither amplified nor clarified any of the points. Except for the new variant formulation regarding the U.S., troop withdrawal-prisoner tradeoff and despite its billing as a new initiative and a breakthrough, the seven-point statement is essentially a rescrambling of the basic Communist position previously tabled at Paris. According to Hanoi propagandists, Madame Binh's proposal "compels Nixon to answer before public opinion the questions that he has in the recent past sought every means to dodge or deceitfully hide from the American people." Hanoi further added that the PRG statement affords public opinion a "sharp weapon" to continue its struggle to demand that President Nixon respond to urgings of the American and Vietnamese peoples.

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